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The spreading of COVID-19 misinformation over social media already draws the attention of many researchers. According to
Google Scholar, about 26000 COVID-19 related misinformation studies have been published to date. Most of these studies
focus on 1) detection and/or 2) analysing the characteristics of COVID-19 related misinformation. However, the study of
the social behaviours related to misinformation is often neglected. In this paper, we introduce a fine-grained annotated
misinformation tweets dataset including social behaviours annotation (e.g. comment or question to the misinformation). The
dataset not only allows social behaviours analysis but is also suitable for both an evidence-based or non-evidence-based
misinformation classification task. In addition, we introduce ’leave claim out’ validation in our experiments and demonstrate that
misinformation classification performance could be significantly different when applying to real-world unseen misinformation.
1 Introduction
The ubiquity of social media has increasingly affected information dissemination and consumption during the COVID-19
pandemic1. With increasing social distancing and growing reliance on online communication, more and more people tend
to use social platforms to seek information during the outbreak of COVID-192. However, the complexity surrounding the
pandemic not only comes from the virus itself, but also from the surge of the social and behavioural issues that the disease
has brought about. While social media allows people to seek information more effectively, the explosion of misinformation
has also caused significant harm to the global community. For instance, the misinformation accompanying the outbreak of
COVID-19 has caused 1) the deaths of more than 700 people from drinking denatured alcohol3; 2) doctors being attacked
because of misinformation e.g. a WhatsApp user claimed “health workers were forcibly taking away Muslims and injecting
them with the coronavirus”4; 3) several 5G towers being burned down by misinformation claiming they cause COVID-195.
Although international fact-checking outlets have increased 400% since 2014 in 60 countries6, false claims and online
misinformation are still pervading social platforms. For instance, websites spreading misinformation had almost four times as
many estimated views as equivalent content from reputable organisations on Facebook (https://secure.avaaz.org/
campaign/en/facebook_threat_health/). To combat COVID-19 misinformation, the worldwide fact-checkers
and media are overloaded. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has termed the situation a global infodemic7 and
launched the ‘Mythbuster’ (https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/
advice-for-public/myth-busters) platform to fight the spread of COVID-19 related misinformation. However,
such counter measures are limited in their ability to combat misinformation, due to the large-scale nature and fast-paced
evolution of online discourse1. While fact checking by professionals (e.g., International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) –
https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/) is a vital defence in the fight against misinformation, it has limited volume and
may not reach the intended audience8. Automatic methods are therefore a pressing need to reliably detect misinformation on a
large scale; however this typically requires a large amount of annotated data to model the semantic feature and discourse in
online misinformation.
Existing COVID-19 misinformation studies mainly focus on the identification of online misinformation9–12, but the
occurrences of other social behaviours related to the misinformation are omitted. Understanding the correlation between
misinformation and its related questions or comments is crucial to investigate the prevalence of misinformation; particularly
since the number of people using social media to ask questions or leave comments related to health advice, especially during
health emergencies, is constantly growing2. Consequently, this paper aims to address three questions: 1) How many social
media posts are questioning or commenting about a misinformation claim and do they correlate? 2) Does the volume of tweets





















misinformation spreading on social media?
Meanwhile, previous COVID-19 misinformation research has investigated the social engagement with fake news on
websites and social platforms9, the ways that misinformation is countered in tweets8 and the stances detection between tweets
and misconceptions12. However, there is a lack of research that evaluates debunk information (provided by professional
fact-checkers) as well as a shortage of effective machine learning classifiers (as these debunk information and provide useful
references to related misinformation).
Addressing such requirements, in this paper, we introduce:
1. An information retrieval experiment to retrieve COVID-19 tweets that are related to the IFCN fact-checked misinformation.
The fact-checked misinformation claims are used as the queries to extract tweets with topics that are similar to the
misinformation.
2. A manually annotated fine-grained COVID-19 misinformation Twitter dataset with 8 categories that are suitable for
training machine learning models to automatically detect misinformation and social behaviours related to COVID-19
misinformation.
3. A quantitative analysis of the fine-grained categories throughout a 10-month period and particularly investigating different
kinds of misinformation tweets.
4. A benchmark experiment evaluating the misinformation classification performance of state-of-the-art NLP models over
fine-to-coarse grained scenarios. Specifically, the fine-grained classification enables the identification of misinformation
and its related social behaviours (e.g. debunks, questions and comments, etc). The coarse-grained classification
labels could be reorganised as (a) Evidence based misinformation classification task and (b) Non-evidence based
misinformation classification task. In the first task, we aim to detect the misinformation that has already been debunked
(the debunked misinformation that is provided by IFCN as the evidence). The misinformation prediction must be
supported with verified misinformation. In the non-evidence based task, we aim to find social media posts that are likely
to be misinformation; however these posts may require human verification.
According to our previous findings13 the topics of COVID-19 misinformation change significantly in different stages of the
pandemic. Evaluating classification over unseen topics is an important step to assess the model performance in a real-world
situation. In this paper, our tweets are retrieved according to IFCN claims (as queries). Therefore, the annotated tweets
are organised to its associated claim. In our experiment, we introduce ’leave claim out’ cross-validation (CV) to ensure the
topics between training and testing data are different. Hence to simulate the real world classification performance over unseen
misinformation. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce ’leave claim out’ cross-validation to evaluate the
misinformation classification performance over unseen claim/topics. We also compare the ’leave claim’ CV with the ’leave
claim out’ CV. Our experimental results suggest that misinformation classification performance is significantly reduced when
applying to real-world unseen misinformation.
2 Related Work
Misinformation on social media has been an increasingly pervasive problem in recent years14. The dissemination of misinfor-
mation related to civil discourse15, natural disasters16 and health emergencies2 has been studied in different social contexts.
Given the popularity of Twitter in the global community, past research has highlighted the importance of studying Twitter
during epidemics. For example, 255 million Twitter users were found active in February 2014 during the start of the Ebola
outbreak17 and this number topped 330 million in 201918. Therefore, Twitter can be utilised as a rich source for the research
community to study the prevalence of online misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic.
2.1 COVID-19 Dataset
With the outbreak of COVID-19, several datasets have been established to assist research communities to fight the pandemic.
Singh et al.19 investigate the early conversations about the pandemic on Twitter, and analyse five predefined myths as well
as links to poor quality tweets between January and March 2020. Dong et al.20 establish a real-time tracking of COVID-19
to help epidemiological forecasting. Chen et al.21 collect COVID-19 scholarly articles for literature-based discoveries, and
track the information spread on Twitter. To analyse how social behaviours are affected by the outbreak of COVID-19 and the
spread of related information on social media on a large scale, Lamsal22 collected 310 million English language tweets related
to COVID-19 and analysed the sentiment, relations between countries and hashtags. Gruzd and May23 release a multi-lingual
Twitter dataset with around 270 million tweets. Gupta et al.10 retrieve over 132 million tweets from around 20 million unique
user IDs, and investigate their latent topics, sentiment and emotions by applying topic models and sentiment analysis.
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In terms of datasets that particularly focused on misinformation related to COVID-19, Micallef et al.8 investigate the
tendency of the misinformation and counter-misinformation (aka. debunks) tweets based on two predefined topics (i.e.
Fake Cures and 5G Conspiracy Theories). These datasets focus on predefined topics and themes, but topics of COVID-19
misinformation are fast-evolving. To tackle this, Cui and Lee9 (CoAID) combine news articles published by reliable media
outlets to identify the misinformation on Twitter. Sharma et al.1 label tweets as misinformation if the tweet shared any
article or content posted from any of the misinformation sources compiled using the fact-checking sources. However, it
is hard to measure the reliability of such data since there is no gold-standard annotation. Saakyan et al.24 (COVIDFACT)
introduced a ‘Counter-Claim’ algorithm that automatically generated false COVID-19 related claims based on the subreddit
r/COVID19 discussion, and obtains a moderate agreement of 0.47 for contradictory claims between models and humans. In this
paper, we use professional IFCN verified claim for misinformation classification, but we are planning to introduce automatic
generated false claims as an additional source to speed up the misinformation debunking. Hossain et al.12 (COVIDLIES) divide
misinformation detection into two sub-tasks: 1) relevant tweets retrieval based on COVID-19 misconceptions, and 2) stance
detection to identify whether the tweets agree or disagree with the misconceptions. Several automatic methods are evaluated
based on a manually annotated dataset, but the data time span is restricted to only a one-month period (i.e. from March to April
2020), meaning the assessment of long term tendencies of misinformation is not possible. Compared with the above dataset,
our dataset investigates a longer time span over 10 months, which cover tweets from the first and second wave of outbreaks in
the US and UK. We also use debunks which were provided by the professional fact-checkers (which provide evidence for the
misinformation tweets).
2.2 COVID-19 Misinformation Detection
Singh et al.19 define five Coronavirus Common Myths based on some keywords searching on the websites. Then the
misinformation is identified based on phrases and words in the tweets and from broad descriptions of the myths (taken from the
original searches that described each myth). Sharma et al.1 compile information from three fact-checking sources (i.e., Media
Bias/Fact Check, NewsGuard and Zimdars) that provide journalistic analysis of low-quality news sources known to frequently
publish unreliable and false information. Similarly, Zhou et al.11 apply Media Bias/Fact Check and NewsGuard to filter out
news sites that are reliable/unreliable, and track misinformation based on the URLs and user information in the tweets.
Several studies apply machine learning methods to model the semantic feature in the misinformation. Micallef et al.8 train
three one-vs-all Logistic Regression classifiers to automatically identify misinformation, counter-misinformation and irrelevant
tweets respectively. Cui and Lee9 evaluate the hierarchical attention network (HAN)25 and its variant dEFEND26 on the CoAID
datasets. Song et al.13 propose a classification-aware neural topic model for a COVID-19 disinformation category classification
and topic discovery. Meanwhile, Li et al.27 evaluate the pre-trained language model BERT28 with ensemble techniques on the
AAAI 2021 Shared Task: COVID-19 Fake News Detection in English. Hossain et al.12 combine BERTScore29 with Sentence
BERT to identify tweets stance for COVID-19 related misconceptions. However, those misinformation detection methods
do not evaluate the effectiveness of using debunk information provided by the professional fact-checkers. In this paper, we
investigate how the debunks would potentially effect the misinformation detection performance.
3 Dataset and Annotation
The overall pipeline of dataset annotation is shown in Figure 1. In general, we first collect tweets based on a set of keywords
and create a COVID-19 related tweets index into the Elasticsearch (https://www.elastic.co/elasticsearch/). We also create
a fact-check dataset, which includes fact-checked misinformation and its meta data from the IFCN websites, and select 90
misinformation claims as the queries to retrieve related tweets from the index. In order to improve the relevance of tweets,
similar to previous research12, we implement a Transformer-based model to re-rank the retrieved tweets based on their semantic
similarities. The re-ranked tweets are then annotated based on fine-grained categories, and the agreement rates between
annotators are evaluated. Finally, several classification tasks are conducted based on different types of data validation methods.
3.1 Tweet Collection
We first identify a collection of keywords (e.g, covid, covid-19, coronavirus, covid_19, etc.) related to COVID-19 and
collect tweets that contain one of those keywords in the hashtag. We use the Twitter Stream API (https://developer.
twitter.com/en/docs/tutorials/consuming-streaming-data) to collect 182,027,646 English tweets span-
ning 10 months from March to December 2020. Then, we create ElasticSearch index for the tweets that are collected.
3.2 IFCN Dataset
In order to have a fact-checked list of COVID-19 related misinformation, we also build a IFCN dataset by utilising the work of
fact-checkers. First, we extract 10,381 fact-checked misinformation claims (referred to as ‘claims’ in the remaining parts of the
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Figure 1. Overall pipeline
select 90 English claims from April 2020, focusing on claims that appeared in the UK and US, since we wanted to maximise the
number of tweets in English that could be retrieved. The IFCN claim extraction and process steps follow the same procedures
as our previous research13 A pattern matching language – JAPE30 is applied to remove the subject from the claim in order to
obtain a precise expression of the misinformation. e.g. “Japanese doctor who won Nobel Prize said coronavirus is artificial
and was manufactured in China” the subject “Japanese doctor who won Nobel Prize said” is removed and the claim shortened
to “coronavirus is artificial and was manufactured in China”. The example subject patterns used in this work can be found in
Figure 1 ‘Claim Subject Matching Patterns’ (yellow) box.
3.3 Tweets Retrieval and Re-ranking
The selected 90 IFCN claims are used as the queries to retrieve tweets from the Elasticsearch index. The initial retrieval utilises
BM25 algorithm31 to extract the 1,000 most relevant tweets from the Twitter index. To mitigate the cost of retrieval time, we
then implement a tinyBERT32 model, which has been pre-trained based on the MS MACRO dataset33 for document ranking, to
re-rank the retrieved tweets based on the semantic similarities between queries and tweets. After re-ranking, we select the 20
most relevant tweets for each misinformation, based on the cosine similarity scores. In addition, we restrict the retrieval for
tweets posted in a date range of 10 weeks before and 2 weeks after the debunk date. This way, we aim to collect tweets related
to a specific misinformation in a certain time, since similar misinformation can appear at different stages (e.g. misinformation
about generic topics like ’a nurse in Italy died after taking the COVID-19 vaccine’ may appear and re-appear at different times,
in different countries, depending on the the vaccine rollout).
3.4 Annotation
We obtained 1,800 tweets after the initial retrieval and re-ranking. Nine volunteer annotators were recruited and we gave them
the instructions available in Appendix A for annotating tweets. The fine-grained categories are listed as following:
1. Misinformation: Tweets contain falsehoods, inaccuracies, rumours, decontextualised truths, or misleading leaps of
logic, and deliver exactly the SAME information/topic as the claim.
2. Related Misinformation: Tweets contain falsehoods, inaccuracies, rumours, decontextualised truths, or misleading
leaps of logic, and deliver a SIMILAR information/topic with the claim but towards, for instance, a different person
name, event name, medication name, illness name, etc.
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3. Debunk: Tweets refute exactly the SAME information/topic as the claim, and are generated either by professional
fact-checkers e.g.government website, IFCN, etc., or general citizen responses with/without use of any checkable
evidence e.g. reputable links, hashtags, etc.
4. Related Debunk: Tweets refute a SIMILAR information/topic with the claim but towards, for instance, a different
person name, event name, medication name, illness name, etc., and are generated either by professional fact-checkers e.g.
government website, IFCN, etc., or general citizen responses with/without use of any checkable evidence e.g. reputable
links, hashtags, etc.
5. Question: Tweets raise a question based on the exact SAME information/topic as the claim.
6. Comments: Tweets add some comments on the exact SAME information/topic as the claim.
7. Relevant Others: A tweet is not misinformation or a debunk of the claim but is nevertheless about the topic of the given
claim.
8. Irrelevant: The information/topic of the Tweets that are IRRELEVANT to the claim.
Before the formal annotation, a pilot annotation was conducted so as to train the annotators. The formal annotation task
was then conducted in a 3-weeks period. We created groups with three annotators each and we kept the same annotators in
each group throughout the 3-weeks task, so each entry was annotated three times to evaluate the annotation agreements. Each
annotator was assigned 200 tweets in each week.
During annotation, each entry provided to the annotators presented the query, the date when the misinformation was
debunked, the fact-checkers’ explanation, the organisation who fact-checked the misinformation, the misinformation veracity
(e.g. false, misleading), and the source link to the fact-checkers’ own web page. The volunteers assign each tweet with the
most relevant of the eight fine-grained categories, and indicate their confidence (on a scale of 0 – least confident – to 5 – most
confident) as well as their comments, if any. The tweet ID, the tweet text, the link to the tweet, and the date of when the tweet
was posted were also provided.
We calculate the Krippendorff’s alpha for each week to assess the data quality, and the final averaged score among the
three weeks is 0.67, which demonstrates a substantial agreement between annotators. The final dataset is produced by merging
the multiple-annotated tweets on the basis of: 1) majority agreement between the annotators where possible; or 2) confidence
score, if there was no majority agreement, the label with the highest confidence score was adopted. From the 1,800 tweets, 78
tweets did not have either majority agreement or a valid confidence score, so we removed those tweets in the final dataset. The
statistics of the final annotated dataset are shown in Table 1 and examples of tweets in each class can be found in Appendix B.
Misinformation Related Misinformation Debunk Related Debunk Question
522 175 194 56 115
Comment Irrelevant Relevant Others Total
99 199 362 1722
Table 1. Number of examples per category in the final dataset.
3.5 Data Analysis
One of the aims of this work is to understand the correlation of the spread of misinformation and debunk with other behaviours.
As shown in Figure 2, firstly, the volume of misinformation tweets is significantly higher than the other categories, especially
at the beginning of April, which coincides with when the first wave of the pandemic started in both United State and United
Kingdom. Secondly, there is a significantly higher volume of ’question and comment’ tweets indicating that people tend to seek
information and leave comments at the beginning of the first wave, but this tendency is decreasing throughout the pandemic. We
also observe that there is a notable correlation between misinformation and debunk tweet counts (Pearson correlation ρ = 0.55,
p < 0.001). This indicates that misinformation tweets and debunk tweets are spread at the same rate, similar to the findings
made in8 and34. The misinformation tweets also have a positive correlation with comment tweets (Pearson correlation ρ = 0.58,
p < 0.001) and question tweets (Pearson correlation ρ = 0.45, p < 0.001), this is similar to the debunk tweets with comment
tweets (Pearson correlation ρ = 0.54, p < 0.001) and question tweets (Pearson correlation ρ = 0.41, p < 0.001). Overall, we
find that the debunk tweets have a similar spreading rate as misinformation tweets. In addition, people tend to leave comments
or ask questions when there is a significantly high number of misinformation and debunks tweets.
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Figure 2. Misinformation, debunk, question and comment tweets volume over time (in weeks).
3.5.1 URL Sources in Misinformation and Debunk Tweets
The top 10 frequent URL domain names found in misinformation and debunk tweets shown in Figure 3. The numbers in
horizontal axe are averaged by number of misinformation/debunk tweets. We note that there is almost no URL overlap between
misinformation and debunk tweets (only overlap URL is cnbc.com), and misinformation tweets are very likely to link to video
website (e.g. youtube.com). We also note that misinformation tweets have high frequency contain URLs than that in the debunk
tweets, and may also contain high-credibility sources (e.g.PubMed). For instance, a misinformation tweet claims that ‘Now
officially : 5G Technology and induction of coronavirus in skin cells published online ahead of print, 2020 Jul 16. J Biol Regul
Homeost Agents, 2020’ and provides a link to ‘pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov’. However, that paper was retracted after a thorough
investigation as it showed evidence of substantial manipulation of the peer review. In addition, several tweets quote information
from ‘clinicaltrials.gov’ and claim that ‘Hydroxychloroquine and Zinc With Either Azithromycin or Doxycycline for Treatment
of COVID-19 in Outpatient Setting’. However, large-scale clinical trials demonstrate no beneficial effect of hydroxychloroquine
in terms of viral shedding, disease severity, or mortality among COVID-19 patients.
3.5.2 Hashtags in Misinformation and Debunk Tweets
Similarly to URLs, we note that a ’hashtag’ is a strong indicator to misinformation as well as debunk tweets. We found that
some misinformation hashtags have negative emotion towards a person or an organisation (e.g., EvilGates, FireFauci, etc.)
and some are generally denying the pandemic (e.g., FakePandemic, coronascam, etc.). On the other hand, hashtags in debunk
tweets are less emotional (e.g., FactMatter, SeekReliableSource, etc.), and some directly indicate the professional fact-checkers
or high-credibility source (e.g., AltNewsFactCheck, pubmed, PIBFactCheck, etc.). Wordclouds of misinformation and debunk
tweets can be found in Appendix C.
4 Experiments
In this section, we conduct a benchmark experiment for our annotated Twitter misinformation classification dataset. This
experiment includes three tasks that represent three different misinformation classification scenarios. The task detail and the
experiment settings are discussed in Section 4.1. Then, we introduce the baseline models and model configurations in Section
4.2. Finally, the experimental results are discussed in Section 4.3.
4.1 Misinformation Classification Tasks
The classification experiment is divided into three tasks. Besides the fine-grained classification task, which takes account of all
labels based on the evidences, we also introduce two coarse-grained classification tasks according to the different hierarchy
methods of the fine-grained classes. The descriptions of each task are listed in the following paragraphs, and the corresponding
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Figure 3. Top 10 frequent URLs found in misinformation and debunk tweets.
1. Fine-grained misinformation classification: Classify the tweet text into one of the eight fine-grained labels introduced
in this paper. This task aims to identify the tweets that might be misinformation, debunk or other associated behaviours
(e.g.tweets that leave comments about debunks or tweets that question about misinformation, etc). Since the informa-
tion/topics of ‘Misinformation’ and ‘Debunk’ tweets are the same as the IFCN claim, and IFCN claims are served a
evidences in our classification task, the fine-grained misinformation classification task is therefore evidence based.
2. Coarse-grained evidence based misinformation classification: Similar to fine-grained classification, this task aims to
classify tweets that have already been debunked, but concentrates more on the misinformation and debunk tweets. In this
case, tweets labelled with ‘Misinformation’ will be treated as ‘Misinformation’ tweets and tweets labelled with ‘Debunk’
will be treated as ‘Debunk’ misinformation. All other labels, including ‘Related Misinformation/Debunk’ are categorised
as ‘Other’.
3. Coarse-grained Non-evidence based misinformation classification: This task aims to classify tweets likely to be
misinformation, where there are no debunks available. Therefore, different to the coarse-grained evidence based task,
the ‘Related Misinformation/Debunk’ labels are categorised as ‘Misinformation/debunks’, together with ‘Misinforma-
tion/Debunk’ tweets.
For each classification task, we report the results based on 5-fold cross-validation. The evaluation metrics used in this
experiments are 1) accuracy, 2) F1 measure for each class, and 3) macro average F1 (i.e. the average of class level F1 Measure)
across all classes. Two different folding methods are used in this experiment:
• Folding without Leave Claim Out: This is the standard 5-fold cross-validation. The training data is randomly split into
five sub-groups. For each sub-group, one sub-group is retained as the validation set, and the remaining sub-groups are
used for training.
• Folding with Leave Claim Out: Similar to the standard 5-fold cross-validation, but the random sub-group splitting
is based on claim rather than on all training data. Therefore no claim in the test set will appear in the training stage.
This is a more realistic testing method to test model performance on ‘unseen’ misinformation since most of the online
misinformation have not been debunked by the professional fact-checkers in the real world.
4.2 Model and Configuration
Four state-of-the-art baseline models are used in this experiment to benchmark the classification task performance. BERT_CLS
and CANTM are the evidence independent models used to test the classification performance without providing claim (please
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Coarse-grained Non-Evidence Based Classification
Misinformation Debunk Other
Misinformation Debunk Question
Related Misinformation Related Debunk Comment
Relevant Other
Irrelevant
Table 2. Coarse-grained classification label hierarchy. The bold texts are the coarse-grained labels, and its corresponding
fine-grained labels are listed in the column beneath
note, claims are applied in this work as evidence) information. BERT_Pair and SBERT are evidence dependent models and
have been widely applied in Natural Language Inference tasks. In this experiment, we apply these two models to test the
performance with the aid of evidence information.
• BERT_CLS: The BERT28 version used in this experiment is a 24 transformer layers (BERT-large) COVID-Twitter
pre-trained35 BERT. Only the parameters in the last transformer encoding layer is unlocked for fine-tuning, the rest of the
BERT weights were frozen for this experiment. BERT_CLS treat all tasks as a Tweet text classification task. The model
input is [CLS] + Tweet_Text + [SEP], and the final hidden state of [CLS] token will be the representation of Tweet_Text.
The probability of labels is predicted using a Softmax classifier based on the Tweet_Text [CLS] representation.
• CANTM: Classification-Aware Neural Topic Model is a stacked asymmetric variational autoencoder that outputs
classification and topic predictions. In this experiment, we only consider the classification output of CANTM model.
CANTM apply the BERT model as input text encoder, and the BERT model setting is the same as BERT_CLS. The
vocabulary size for CANTM is 3,000 with 50 latent topics.
• Sentence-BERT (SBERT): We apply SBERT36 classification objective function for our classification experiment. SBERT
classification objective function aiming to optimise the cross-entropy loss of a softmax classifier (o= so f tmax(W (q, t, |q−
t|))). The input feature of the classifier is the weighted concatenation of evidence embedding (q), tweet text embedding
(t) and the element-wise difference |q− t|. In this experiment, all embeddings are obtained from [CLS] token of
COVID-Twitter pre-trained35 BERT, and apply the same setting as BERT_CLS. The evidence of the tweet text is the
claim that is described in Section 3.3.
• BERT_Pair: Similar to BERT_CLS, but BERT_Pair also takes evidence into consideration. The input of the model is
[CLS] + Evidence + [SEP] + Tweet_Text + [SEP]. BERT_Pair has been originally applied for the next sentence prediction
task and has been fine-tuned for pair-wise text classification such as Natural Language Inference. The probability of
labels is predicted using a Softmax classifier based on the pairwise [CLS] representation. We experiment BERT_Pair
model with two different settings: 1) The results labelled with BERT_Pair_MNLI are trained with the Multi-Genre
Natural Language Inference (MNLI) corpus37. The MNLI labels contradiction, entailment and neutral corresponding to
the debunk, misinformation, and other in our misinformation classification task. 2) The results labelled with BERT_Pair
are trained with our labelled misinformation data (5-fold cross-validation)
4.3 Coarse-Grained Classification Results
Table 3 shows the results of coarse-grained misinformation classification tasks. In the without ‘leave claim out’ cross validation
all models achieved more than 0.75 accuracy in both evidence- and non-evidence-based classification tasks. The best performed
models are SBERT and BERT_Pair. Both models are evidence dependent and able to reach around 0.8 classification accuracy
in both coarse-grained tasks.
Compared between two coarse-grained tasks, all baseline models have lower average F1 scores in the evidence-based
classification task than non-evidence-based classification. This may be because: 1) Evidence-based classification is a more
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Without Leave Claim Out Cross Validation



















BERT_CLS 0.789 0.771 0.709 0.803 0.799 0.759 0.715 0.608 0.729 0.808
CANTM 0.792 0.762 0.664 0.816 0.806 0.779 0.722 0.597 0.739 0.830
SBERT 0.808 0.789 0.724 0.815 0.828 0.804 0.753 0.643 0.765 0.851
BERT_Pair 0.797 0.787 0.749 0.807 0.804 0.808 0.757 0.665 0.760 0.846
With Leave Claim Out Cross Validation
BERT_CLS 0.648 0.609 0.487 0.672 0.668 0.632 0.533 0.405 0.490 0.705
CANTM 0.640 0.584 0.448 0.647 0.657 0.622 0.477 0.252 0.453 0.724
SBERT 0.662 0.613 0.476 0.681 0.681 0.632 0.550 0.409 0.526 0.715
BERT_Pair 0.634 0.595 0.470 0.656 0.657 0.643 0.567 0.468 0.508 0.724
BERT_Pair_MNLI 0.455 0.396 0.384 0.227 0.578 0.514 0.395 0.312 0.219 0.655
Table 3. COVID-19 coarse-grained misinformation classification results.
challenging task. In the non-evidence-based classification, the misinformation or debunks can be determined according to
previously learned topics/information that was included in the training data. However, evidence-based classification is a pairwise
classification task, misinformation/debunks can only be determined according to the given evidence. Hence, a tweet text cannot
be classified as misinformation/debunk if it does not match the given evidence even the tweet text is misinformation/debunk
(with other evidence). 2) Data is more imbalanced in evidence-based classification task. According to the label hierarchy
(Table 2), related misinformation and debunks are categorised as ‘Other’ class in the evidence-based classification. This reduces
the number of training samples in the misinformation/debunks classes, and increases the samples in the other class. According
to the results, although the average F1 scores are lower, the ‘Other’ class F1 scores are better than the non-evidence-based
classification task.
In the ‘leave claim out’ cross-validation, all models decreased at least 15% in average F1 measure compared to ‘without
leave claim out’ cross-validation. This is expected, since in the ‘leave claim out’ cross-validation, the topics between training
and testing set are different, and models cannot make a prediction based on its learned misinformation topics. According to the
results, models are over-fitted to the misinformation topics from the training set. This also indicates that keeping the training
data up-to-date is important to maintain the model’s real-world misinformation classification performance.
According to the class-level F1 score, the performance of misinformation classification is better than debunk classification.
This may happen because of the class imbalance problem. The number of debunk and related debunk samples is much smaller
(about 1/3) than misinformation and related misinformation samples. This problem is also reflected in the number of debunking
posts being much smaller than the misinformation posts on social media. A faster misinformation debunk using an automated
NLP algorithm will help prevent misinformation.
In the last row of Table 3 the classification performance of the Multi-Genre Natural Language Inference trained BERT_PairMNLI
model is shown (the average F1 score of MNLI mismatched development set is 0.73). The BERT_PairMNLI have almost
identical F1 score (0.39) in both tasks. Hence, the traditional natural language inference trained model may not be suitable for
misinformation classification.
4.4 Fine-Grained Classification Results
Table 4 shows the results of the fine-grained misinformation classification task. The fine-grained misinformation classification
task is evidence-based. This task further split the other class from the coarse-grained evidence-based classification task into six
more granular classes (Related Debunk, Related Misinformation, Comment, Question, Relevant Other and Irrelevant) according
to the given evidence. In the ‘without leave claim out’ cross-validation, all models drop around 0.2 average F1 scores compared
to the coarse-grained evidence-based classification task. The main performance decrease occurred in the fine-grained ‘Other’
classes. The debunk and misinformation class-level F1 measure remains similar in performance (but slightly worse) as the
coarse-grained evidence-based classification task. This is because the number of misinformation and debunk training samples
are the same as coarse-grained evidence-based classification. The main challenge of the fine-grained classification is to predict
samples from ‘Other’ classes further into six fine-grained classes.
Figure 4a shows the confusion matrix of BERT_Pair results in the fine-grained classification ‘without leave claim out’ vali-
dation. According to the figure, most ‘Related Debunk/Misinformation’ samples are misclassified as ‘Debunk/Misinformation’.
This may happen because all training samples are semantically similar to the IFCN claim (the training samples are the top 20
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Without Leave Claim Leave Claim
BERT_CLS CANTM SBERT BERT_Pair BERT_CLS CANTM SBERT BERT_Pair
Accuracy 0.584 0.621 0.639 0.615 0.310 0.349 0.353 0.370
F1 0.515 0.524 0.555 0.524 0.271 0.277 0.259 0.276
Debunk F1 0.622 0.638 0.630 0.602 0.333 0.312 0.361 0.382
MisInfo F1 0.671 0.736 0.757 0.742 0.373 0.476 0.535 0.495
R-Debunk F1 0.293 0.264 0.409 0.258 0.025 0.0 0.071 0.038
R-MisInfo F1 0.416 0.439 0.478 0.434 0.135 0.085 0.069 0.131
COMM F1 0.239 0.224 0.159 0.209 0.110 0.221 0.143 0.149
QUES F1 0.715 0.695 0.719 0.697 0.613 0.623 0.451 0.578
REL F1 0.595 0.624 0.646 0.635 0.335 0.343 0.309 0.320
IRREL F1 0.573 0.572 0.643 0.613 0.248 0.158 0.131 0.116
Table 4. COVID-19 misinformation fine-grained query based classification. The corresponding class label are
R-Debunk:Related Debunk, R-MisInfo:Related Misinformation, COMM:comment, QUES:question, REL:Relevant Other,
IRREL:irrelevant
(a)
Steam from boiling oranges kills COVID-19.Claim 1
#Fact: No scientific evidence to prove that inhaling hot water steam kills #CoronavirusTweet Text
Prediction: DEBUNK Label: RELATED_DEBUNK
Research proves that commercial mouthwash could protect against COVID-19.Claim 2
Mouthwash could prevent COVID-19 transmission, scientists say https://… via @... @...  This is a 
reckless headline. It should read, "Scientists theorize mouthwash may prevent COVID-19, more 
research needed." #scicomm #covid19 cc @...
Tweet Text
Prediction: MISINFORMATION Label: COMMENT
(b)
Figure 4. (a) BERT_Pair confusion matrix in the fine-grained classification ’without leave claim out’ validation. Numbers in
each row are the number of samples labelled in the corresponding class, and numbers in each column are the number of
samples which have been predicted in the corresponding class. (b) Example of misclassified cases.
tweets with the highest BERT embedding cosine similarity to claim), and the model is unable to catch the difference between
them. An example of this error type is presented in Figure 4b, Claim 1.
The misinformation claim states that steam from "boiling oranges" kills COVID-19. However, the tweet text being classified
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is debunking steam from "boiling water" kills COVID-19. The debunk is not directly addressing the query misinformation,
therefore, the label should be "RELATED DEBUNK".
Another major classification error occurs in the ‘Comment’ class. The class level F1 scores for the ‘Comment’ class are less
than 0.25 with all baseline models. According to the confusion matrix, the ‘Comment’ labelled samples are very likely to be
classified as misinformation. The comment class contains tweets that make a comment about the misinformation. Therefore,
the misinformation is included in the comment tweet, which might be the main cause of this error. In Figure 4b, Claim 2 is an
example of comment text. The tweet text quote a misinformation claim ‘Mouthwash could prevent COVID-19 transmission’
and make comment that ‘more research needed’ for this claim.
In ’leave claim out’ cross-validation, all model average F1 score less than 0.3. Therefore, none of the baseline models are
reliable for unseen fine-grained misinformation classification. This may be because all models are over-fitted with training data
due to the limited number of samples in most classes. We also note that, only the ‘Misinformation’ class-level F1 score remains
similar to the coarse-grained query-based task, and the ‘Misinformation’ class have the most number of samples in the dataset.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduced a fine-grained COVID-19 misinformation dataset, which contains 1,722 tweets with eight categories
that are manually annotated. In our dataset, each tweet is triple annotated and the averaged Krippendorff’s alpha is 0.67
which indicates a substantial agreement. To answer the research question above, we first found that misinformation tweets
have similar spread rate to debunk tweets. Secondly, our dataset also enables the investigation of the occurrences of other
social behaviours (e.g. questions or comments related to a misinformation) in tweets. We found both question and comment
tweets have positive correlation with misinformation and debunk tweets. Thirdly, we also found that misinformation tweets
can contain a URL from high-credibility sources. In addition, the hashtags in misinformation tweets are found to be more
emotional, and debunk hashtags are more related to the professional fact-checkers. Our experiments in Section 4 conduct three
misinformation classification benchmark experiments: 1) Non-evidence based classification 2) Evidence based classification
and 3) Fine-grained classification. The results demonstrate that the all baseline models well performed in standard ‘without
leave claim out’ validation across all classification tasks. However, the classification performance dropped significantly with
‘leave claim out’ setting. Therefore, we need to regularly update training instances to ensure the classification performance over
time. In the future, we need to develop a classification method to adapt to the fast topic changing nature of misinformation.
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This is the annotation guideline for assigning labels to the tweets based on a
claim. A claim is a piece of misinformation which has been debunked by
reputable organizations. For annotating a tweet, you should follow the steps
below:
1. Read the label definitions thoroughly, the table below shows examples of
tweets in each label.
2. Read the claim first in each sheet, you can also find other information
regarding the claim at the top of the sheet (e.g., explanation to the
claim, debunk organizations, etc).
3. Read each tweet text thoroughly and check the link(s) in the tweet text if
there is one.
4. Select one of the labels listed.
5. Please give a short description on why you chose the label for the tweet
in the NOTE column.
6. Please indicate a confidence score to your annotation at the CONFIDENT
column, the confidence score is in the range of 1 to 5, e.g., 1 is extremely
unconfident, 5 is extremely confident.
Tips: Check whether the link in the tweet is reputable (e.g., from the government website,
WHO, a reputable news organisation like the BBC or the Washington Post). For example, a
tweet might be a debunk if the tweet text or any linked content refute the claim and it also
comes with a reputable source (e.g. BBC). Additionally, use the LINK TO THE TWEET to check
the validity of the original tweet, for example, check the validity of the user by looking at the
description of the user account. Also, check the post date of tweet and the source link date
to see if there is a big time gap: some misinformation might be selected from old sources
that happened a long time ago.
Table of definition, and an example claim with corresponding tweets
Example Claim: “A new virus called hantavirus, sourced from rats, was discovered in China.”
Label Definition Example Tweet Text
MISINFO Tweets contain falsehoods, inaccuracies,
rumors, decontextualized truths, or
misleading leaps of logic, and deliver
exactly the SAME information/topic as the
claim.
Hantavirus - New Virus in China
from Rats
RELATED_MISINFO Tweets contain falsehoods, inaccuracies,
rumors, decontextualized truths, or
misleading leaps of logic, and deliver a
SIMILAR information/topic with the claim
but toward e.g. different person name,
event name, medication name, illness
name, etc.
NOTE: Make sure the source is not reputable and
cross check against a Google search, as it could be
a RELATED DEBUNK or IRRELEVANT)
BREAKING: China has discovered
a new virus called G4 virus.
Warns of another pandemic.
DEBUNK Tweets refute exactly the SAME
information/topic as the claim, and are
generated either by professional
fact-checkers e.g., government website,
IFCN, etc.,  or general citizen responses
with/without use of any checkable
evidence e.g., reputable links, hashtags,
etc.
A claim has circulated in multiple
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube
that a "new virus" named
hantavirus has emerged in China
in March 2020. The claim is false.
#FakeNews
RELATED_DEBUNK Tweets refute a SIMILAR information/topic
with the claim but toward e.g. different
person name, event name, medication
name, illness name, etc. ,  and are
generated either by professional
fact-checkers e.g., government website,
IFCN, etc.,  or general citizen responses
with/without use of any checkable
evidence e.g., reputable links, hashtags,
etc.
The claim that a new virus
named fancyvirus has been
discovered in France is false.
http://who.ini
QUESTION Tweets raise a question based on the exact
SAME information/topic as the claim.
Is a new virus “hantavirus”
discovered in China?
COMMENT Tweets add some comments on the exact
SAME information/topic as the claim.
share more info about the new
hantavirus
IRRELEVANT The information/topic of the Tweets that
are IRRELEVANT to the claim.
Trump claims he inherited broken
tests from Obama, for a virus
that was discovered in 2019.
Jesus wept. #Covid_19
RELEVANT A tweet is not misinformation or a debunk
of the claim but is nevertheless about the
topic of the given claim, should be labelled
as RELEVANT.
Hantavirus virus may cause similar
symptoms as Covid-19.
OTHER/NOT_SURE If you are not sure, please use this label. News about the virus will be
reported tomorrow. #News.
B A example of fine-grained COVID-19 misinformation dataset.
Misinformation: 5G is weakening the immune system, which causes the coronavirus.
Related misinformation: 5g towers cause weakening immune systems. 5g is harmful to human cells.
Question:They say 5G weakens our immune system. Is 5G killing people and animals???
Comment: I see a lot of people calling others dumb who believe 5G could contribute to weakening the immune system which
creates greater risk to contract Covid-19 I suggest you watch this.
Debunk: There’s Zero evidence 5G can weaken immune system or causes Coronavirus COVID19 spread in Iran with Zero 5G
coverage Do not spread panic and fake news!
Related Debunk: There’s no evidence 5G is going to harm our health, so let’s stop worrying about it.
Relevant Other: Saw the JoeRogan podcast The question about 5G is, does it weaken the immune system? There are other
questions about this virus too of course That is the 5G one though.
Irrelevant: Shelter In Place Is Weakening The Immune Systems Of Everyone Who Complies.
C Dataset wordclouds from misinformation and debunk tweets.
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